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SUMMARY
The external factors that influence the environmental,
socialandeconomicperformanceof loggingcompanies
were studied using a questionnaire submitted to
30 logging concessions in five countries of the
Congo Basin. This paper analyses socioeconomic
constraints and environmental impacts experienced
by these concessions, as well as their response to
major external drivers of change. Concessionaires
considered investment and operating finance their
main constraint, followed by insufficient technical
and human capacities, and inconsistent application of
official regulations. Environmental problems directly
produced by concessions’ operations represented
around one-third of the total score for environmental
problems reported. Damage caused by construction
of logging roads and erosion were identified as the
main issues. Induced problems (two-thirds of the total
score) were dominated by hunting, with encroachment
and illegal logging perceived as much less significant.
Policies, infrastructure, markets and technology are
key external drivers of change in concessions’ practices,
while regional and international forestry institutions
reportedly have the least influence, reflecting an
emerging scepticism about the proliferation of
international institutions and initiatives promoting
sustainable forestry.
Keywords: Congo Basin, drivers of change, environmental
impacts, industrial logging, socioeconomic constraints
INTRODUCTION
The Congo Basin is home to the second largest area of
tropical rainforest in the world. The forests of the region
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are very important because of their global biodiversity value,
as the resource base for major export-oriented industries,
and for the wide variety of products and services they
provide to local communities. As early as 1912, during the
German colonization period in Cameroon, those values were
recognized through the adoption of legal prescriptions for
granting of logging permits only to non-abusive forestry
concerns (He´din 1930).
At independence there were only a few scattered industrial
logging operations in the region, mainly near the coast.
However during the post-colonial period, log exports became
significant contributors to the economies of all of the countries.
The last two decades have seen rapid expansion of industrial
logging and concessions have now been allocated throughout
the more accessible forests of all countries. Only a few
remote areas in the heart of Gabon and the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) are free of major logging activities
(Minnemeyer 2002). Over the past decade, the operating
environment for logging companies (and other industrial
sectors) has become more difficult. Economies are stagnant
or declining, institutions and infrastructure are weak, armed
conflict has destabilized several countries and corruption has
become rampant (Baker et al. 2003; Muna 2004). Illegal
forestry operations have become such a problem that they are
the subject of international conferences (Kabemba 2003). In
some locations, like East and Central Cameroon, established
companies suffer increasing competition from an explosion of
illegal activity (Fabing & Bakouma 2002; Djire 2004).
A number of conservation priority setting exercises have
recognized the forests as having global environmental values,
mainly for their unique biodiversity (Mittermeier et al. 1999).
The forests of the region are now the object of a major
international conservation initiative (Congo Basin Forest
Partnership launched at the World Summit on Environment
and Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002
(USAID [US Agency for International Development] 2006).
Despite this, industrial logging remains a major economic
activity in Congo Basin countries. It is normally highly
selective, extracting less than two trees per hectare, (FAO
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[Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations]
2003) although areas close to ports have generally been
more intensively logged. As elsewhere in the tropics
(Pearce et al. 2003), logging is controversial and hotly
debated, especially by conservation and development non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and industrial lobbies.
These interest groups are taking contrasting and diverse
positions. Some NGOs have engaged in a ‘stick and carrot’
approach, trying to promote sustainable forest management
through certification, demonstration projects and general
technical support (for example the WWF [Worldwide Fund
for Nature], WRI [World Resources Institute]-Global Forest
Watch).While remaining generally critical of loggingpractices
in the region, they believe that promoting sustainable forestry
is more likely to lead to better environmental and social
outcomes than simply opposing all logging. At the same time,
some media and NGOs have remained highly critical of the
corruption associated with logging and have portrayed any
logging activity as inevitably damaging to the environment
and to the livelihoods of local people (for example WRM
[World RainforestMovement] 2002; Greenpeace Switzerland
2004), and some authors have portrayed logging as an integral
part of a dysfunctional society (Labrousse & Verschave
2003).
Logging has occurred in areas of armed conflict, being both
the cause and the effect of these conflicts. The term ‘conflict
timber’ has been coined to describe timber that has been ex-
ploited to fund wars (Klare 2002; Verbelen 2003; Thomson &
Kanaan 2004). The bushmeat trade is portrayed as a major
environmental concern (Robinson & Bennett 2000; Brown &
Williams 2003), commonly triggered or facilitated by logging
infrastructures. These issues have helped create an overall
negative perception of the logging industry in the region that
tends to consider it as an internally homogeneous sector,
uniformly unsustainable, closely linked to corrupt political
elites and possessing insufficient incentives to apply modern
concepts of sustainable forest management (Labrousse &
Verschave 2003; Vandenhaute & Heuse 2006).
Yet field experience shows that there is a great deal of
variability in the way logging companies operate (Debroux &
Karsenty 1997; Guilguy 1997; Karsenty & Pierre 2005; Ruiz
Pe´rez et al. 2005). A number of logging concessions are close
to (Tansformation Reef Cameroon), or have recently achieved
(Congolaise Industrielle des Bois, Wijma) certification by
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), as meeting its strict
criteria for sustainable forest management (WWF Central
African Regional Programme Office 2005; Forest Peoples
Programme 2006; FSC 2006). The overall objective of this
study was to investigate how this variability of logging
conditions relates to variability of socioeconomic constraints
and environmental problems as perceived by the loggers
themselves, and to determine what forces a diverse logging
industry to change their practices. We focused our study on
the five ITTO (International Tropical Timber Organization)
member countries of the region, namely Cameroon, CAR
(Central African Republic), Congo, DRC and Gabon.
METHODS
A questionnaire survey was designed around two sets of
questions. The first related to the perception of socioeconomic
and environmental problems caused by logging operations
in the concession and the surrounding area. The second
investigated the assessment of concessionaires of the main
‘drivers of change’, the external factors causing them to alter
their plans and practices. The questions have been used to
assess variations in concessionaires’ perceptions of problems
according to concession categories.
The questionnaire consisted of nine socioeconomic and
seven environmental factors.Most socioeconomic factorswere
split into sub-headings that were later averaged to give a
factor’s mean value. In addition, the questionnaire sought
the views of the logging companies on 12 potential drivers of
change. Responses were scored on a scale of 1 to 5; factors
that were not considered relevant by interviewees were given
a score of 0.
Concessionswere grouped by size: small (< 5000 ha), which
is the usual limit for community and artisanal concessions
in the region; medium (5000–100 000 ha); large (100 000–
250 000 ha) and very large (> 250 000 ha). We distinguished
companies financed internationally from those with national
capital. Lastly, we classified companies according to whether
their main markets were within the region, in Europe or in
Asia.
In order to standardize the questionnaire’s implementation
and subsequent analysis, three regional meetings were
organized: a first meeting to define and interpret the
questions and the way in which they were going to be posed
to the concessionaires; an intermediate meeting to check
questionnaire progress and data validation; and a finalmeeting
devoted to the analysis and common interpretation of results.
The questionnaire was administered to senior concession
managers through personal interviews. We applied the
questionnaire to a stratified sample of 30 concessions selected
on the basis of their willingness to cooperate and quality
of the information they could provide. We included 5–7
concessions per country and attempted to include concessions
from different categories of legal status and ownership
(Table 1).
The analysis of problems and drivers of change at the most
aggregated level was based on mean values calculated from
the scores given by respondents. The analysis of detailed
factors within each of the above main dimensions was based
on raw data, except when the factor was split in sub-headings,
in which case we used mean sub-heading values for the
factor. Non-parametric tests for more than two independent
samples (Kruskal-Wallis χ 2), appropriate for ordinal data,
more robust to outliers and not requiring normal distribution,
were conducted to assess differences (at p > 0.10) between
countries and concession categories. Cluster analysis (distance
similarity index and UPGMA [Unweighted Pair Group
Method with Arithmetic mean]) was used to analyse the
association between different drivers of change.
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Table 1 Distribution of the sample by main category.
Category Sample size
Country Cameroon 7
Central African Republic 5
Congo 7
Democratic Republic of Congo 5
Gabon 6
Origin of capital National 10
Foreign 20
Size Small 4
Medium 6
Large 10
Very large 10
Market Local - national 7
European 18
Asian 5
Table 2 Decreasing relevance of socioeconomic problems: mean
and median scores.
Problems Mean Median
Funding 3.2 4
Capacity 2.5 3
Rule implementation 2.5 3
Macroeconomics 2.4 2
Pressure groups 2.3 2
Social context 2.2 2
Demand 2.1 2
Legal framework 1.9 1
Granting procedures 1.9 1
Given the large variation among countries in the number
of officially recorded logging concessions, our sample did not
provide the same intensity of samplingper country.Moreover,
some categories like small size (frequently community
operated) concessions did not occur in all countries. This,
together with the relatively small size of the sample which
precludes cross tabulation and controls for possible effects of
different categories, was a limitation of the study.
RESULTS
Perception of socioeconomic constraints by
concessionaires
Mean scores for the nine groups of constraints (Table 2)
showed a smooth increase from those perceived as the
least important (concession granting procedures and legal
frameworks, mean scores of 1.9) to those perceived as more
significant (implementation of rules and technical and human
capacities, mean scores of 2.5). Finance-related constraints
scored highest, with a mean of 3.2.
Concessions showed variations in the assessment of
socioeconomic constraints by country (Kruskal-Wallis
χ 2 = 15.339; df= 4; p= 0.004). The DRC was perceived as
the most problematic country. Cameroon received the second
highest score and showed the largest in-country variation,
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Figure 1 Interquartile distribution box-plot for socioeconomic
problems by size of concession and origin of capital. The rectangle
indicates the interquartile range (25% and 75% of cases), the thick
line crossing it indicates the median; small circles represent outliers
(between 1.5 and 3 times the box length).
illustrating the larger diversity of concession types included
in the sample. These ranged from well-established and
well-connected large-scale industrial operations to recently
established small community concessions. The scores in the
other three countries were similar and lower than those of
DRC and Cameroon.
We expected that different types of concessions would
experience different constraints and would have different
perceptions of key problems. In particular, we tested the
effect of concession size and origin of capital in the rating of
constraints (Fig. 1). The box-plot indicates that intermediate
size concessions tended to score higher than small and very
large concessions,mediumand large sized concessions tending
to give higher scores, however the differences were not
significant (χ 2 = 5.718; df= 3; p= 0.126).
Differences in the rating of constraints (Fig. 2)
were significant for finance (particularly affecting small
concessions) (χ 2 = 9.485; df= 3; p= 0.023), macroeconomic
context (middle size concessions) (χ 2 = 7.315; df= 3;
p= 0.063) and action of pressure groups (middle size and
small concessions) (χ 2 = 8.501; df= 3; p= 0.037).
Likewise, differences in the rating of socioeconomic
constraints according to origin of capital were statistically
significant (χ 2 = 5.263; df= 1; p= 0.022; Fig. 1) the scores
being highest for national concessions. There were major
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Figure 2 Interquartile distribution box-plot of statistically
significant problems by concession size: (a) macroeconomics,
(b) funding and (c) pressure groups. Small circles represent outliers
(between 1.5 and 3 times the box length); asterisks represent
extreme values (more than 3 times the box length).
differences in perceptions of individual constraints, these
being significant for finance (χ 2 = 6.354; df= 1; p= 0.012),
market demand (χ 2 = 7.028; df= 1; p= 0.008) and technical
and human capacities (χ 2 = 4.442; df= 1; p= 0.035).
Alternatively, although not statistically significant, foreign-
owned concessions tended to experience more problems than
national concessions in adjusting to legal requirements.
Bushfires - 5%
Illegal logging - 10%
0 1 2 3 4 5
0
2
4
6
8
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
importance of hunting impacts
Crops - 17%
Hunting - 31%
Roads - 17%
Erosion - 12%
Pollution - 8%
Figure 3 Perception of environmental impacts by concessionaires.
The percentage represents the contribution of the scores of that
particular impact to the total sum of scores for all impacts.
Endogenous problems are labelled in italics. The histogram shows
the distribution of scores for hunting.
Perception of environmental problems by
concessionaires
Environmental impacts represented as the percentage
contribution of the scores for that particular impact to the
sum of scores for all impacts helped us to discern two basic
types of environmental problems: those endogenous to the
concession, caused by actual logging practices, and those
where the concession was a ‘facilitator’ but not a direct cause.
The first group includes three issues, in increasing order of
importance: pollution, erosion and damage caused by logging
roads (Fig. 3).Together they accounted for 37%of total scores
of all problems identified.
Concessionaires recognized that their presence led to
problems that were outside their immediate control. They
ranked increasing frequency of bush fires as a very minor
problem, but acknowledged progressively increasing impacts
of illegal logging, encroachment and hunting in areas where
logging infrastructure facilitated illegal access. The term
‘encroachment’ denotes farmers taking advantage of logging
roads to move into concession areas in violation of the law
and of concessionaire’s plans. We differentiated this from the
exercise of the rights of local populations that felt that the
concession had taken over their traditional lands. Together
illegal logging, encroachment and hunting contributed 63%
of the total scores for all perceived problems. It is noteworthy
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Table 3 Decreasing relevance of drivers of change: mean and me-
dian scores. ITTO= International Tropical Timber Organisation,
OAB=Organisation Africaine du Bois, CEFDHAC=Confe´rence
sur les Ecosyste`mes de Foreˆts Denses et Humides d’Afrique
Centrale, COMIFAC=Confe´rence des Ministres de Foreˆts de
l’Afrique Centrale.
Driver of change Mean Median
New policies 3.6 4
Infrastructures 3.1 3
Markets 2.4 2
Technological changes 2.4 2
Certification 2.2 2
Continental competition 2.2 2
Pressure groups 2.1 2
Regional competition 1.8 1
ITTO 1.7 1
OAB 1.5 1
CEFDHAC 1.3 1
COMIFAC 1.2 1
that most respondents considered hunting a major problem
(Fig. 3). All but one of the respondents mentioned it, and it
was seen as particularly serious in Cameroon.
There are clear differences between nationally and
foreign owned concessions. National and foreign owned
concessions gave similar environmental problem scores
(2.64 and 2.69, respectively). However, the importance
they gave to ‘endogenous’ and ‘induced’ problems differed
(χ 2 = 4.636; df= 1; p= 0.031 for endogenous, χ 2 = 4.359;
df= 1; p= 0.037 for induced). Nationally owned concessions
tend to assign almost three times as much importance to
induced impacts as to endogenous ones. Conversely, foreign
owned concessions saw endogenous impacts, directly created
by the concession, as more important than those created by
external agents induced by their presence.
Drivers influencing changes in concessionaire
behaviour
New policies, changes in infrastructure, markets and
technology were the main drivers of changes in the logging
industry of the region (Table 3). At the other extreme, regional
and international forest-related institutions were considered
to have the least direct influence. Competition with other
countries in the region and with logs from South America
and South-east Asia were seen as only having moderate
influence on concession activities. Institutional relations,
pressure groups and certification were also only seen as having
a moderate influence in promoting change.
Scores for the importance of drivers of change varied
among countries (χ 2 = 10.552; df= 4; p= 0.032). The DRC
had the highest scores, followed by the Republic of Congo
and Cameroon with intermediate scores, and Gabon and the
CARwith the lowest scores. Countries also showed significant
differences in the importance given to competition within
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Figure 4 Interquartile distribution box-plot of drivers of change by
size, market orientation and capital.
the region (χ 2 = 10.938; df= 4; p= 0.027) and competition
with South America and South-east Asia (χ 2 = 8.000; df= 4;
p= 0.092). There were also significant differences in percep-
tions of the role of technological change (χ 2 = 10.642; df= 4;
p= 0.031), new policies (χ 2 = 10.556; df= 4; p= 0.032) and
the Confe´rence sur les Ecosyste`mes de Foreˆts Denses et
Humides d’Afrique Centrale (CEFDHAC), a civil society
forum convened by the World Conservation Union (IUCN)
(χ 2 = 10.560; df= 4; p= 0.032) amongst the countries.
Cameroon scored highest for the impact of CEFDHAC.
We expected that the importance of drivers of change
would differ amongst the types of concession, and investigated
effects of size, markets and origin of capital on the rating
of these drivers. Although not statistically significant, scores
for the importance of drivers of change tended to be highest
in medium to large concessions (Fig. 4). Medium to large
concessions also scored highest for socioeconomic constraints,
and stood out in their strong differentiation of technology
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(χ 2 = 10.592; df= 3; p= 0.014). Although all types of
concessions considered infrastructure as a main factor
determining change, medium and large concessions rated it
significantly higher than small and very large concessions
(χ 2 = 7.599; df= 3; p= 0.055). They operate in an
intermediate scale between small concessions generally located
near inhabited places and depending totally on public
infrastructure, and the very large concessions that operate in
remote areas and usually construct their own infrastructure.
Market orientation was the only factor significantly
differentiating the scores of drivers of change (χ 2 = 5.433;
df= 2; p= 0.066). Concessions supplying the European
market rated the influence of drivers of change significantly
higher than those supplying Asian or domestic markets
(Fig. 4). Such scoring difference was particularly strong
for competition with South America and South-east Asia,
with higher scores for concessions supplying the European
market (χ 2 = 9.016; df= 2; p= 0.011). ITTO as a driver
of change was also significantly more important for
concessions supplying the European market (χ 2 = 5.748;
df= 2; p= 0.056).
Although the difference was not significant, companies
supported by international capital tended to score higher
than national entities. Competition with South America and
South-east Asia (χ 2 = 14.530; df= 1; p= 0.000) and ITTO
(χ 2 = 3.485; df= 1; p= 0.062) differentiated these groups,
with foreign companies giving higher scores for both (Fig. 4).
Cluster analysis indicated a close association between
the five regional and international institutions with a
forest mandate (ITTO; African Timber Organization
[ATO]; Confe´rence des Ministres de Foreˆts de l’Afrique
Centrale [COMIFAC]; and CEFDHAC) all of which
were perceived as related and scoring low as drivers of
change (Fig. 5). Certification was associated with pressure
groups. The influence of markets tended to be associated
with intra-regional and inter-continental competition, while
technological change seemed to be loosely related to
infrastructure. New policies, the driver with the highest score,
formed an outlier, indicating its special relevance.
DISCUSSION
A number of patterns and statistically significant trends
emerge from the data, suggesting that the basic approach was
sound and that results reflected the great range of variability
that exists within the industrial logging sector in Central
Africa.
Our analyses illustrate a number of specific issues related to
country and type of concession.The concessionaires identified
lack of finance as themain socioeconomic constraint they were
experiencing. Small concessionaires’ answers highlighted the
lack of investment and weak cash-flow as major constraints.
Larger companies reported beingmore hampered by taxation,
corruption costs. Lack of technical and human capacities and
inconsistent application of official regulations and rules were
seen as slightly less serious problems.
Markets
Regional competition
Certification
Pressure groups
COMIFAC
CEFDHAC
OAB
OIBT
Continental competition
Technological change
Infrastructure
Policies
Figure 5 Unweighted pair group method with arithmetic mean
(UPGMA) cluster groups of drivers of change.
OIBT=Organisation Internationale des Bois Tropicaux (Also
known as ITTO), OAB=Organisation Africaine du Bois,
CEFDHAC=Confe´rence sur les Ecosyste`mes de Foreˆts Denses et
Humides d’Afrique Centrale, COMIFAC=Confe´rence des
Ministres de Foreˆts de l’Afrique Centrale.
The significantly higher scores for constraints in the DRC
are consistent with the prevailing precarious situation in that
country (International Crisis Group 2005). Logging activities
were just resuming after a decade of civil strife, infrastructure
was deficient or non-existent, administration was inefficient,
and the sector was being restructured. There has been strong
World Bank pressure for new regulations to facilitate the
sustainable expansion of industrial logging (Kuediasala 2005).
Cameroon contrasted strongly with the situation in the DRC.
The regulatory framework was comprehensive, a permanent
forest estate had been demarcated and concessions were
allocatedon thebasis of public auctions.Therewas abanon the
export of logs for some important species. The requirement
that logs be processed locally was creating a problem of
industrial over-capacity for a shrinking resource base.
The results suggest that sensitivity to socioeconomic
constraints was affected by size of concession. In general,
concessions in our very large and small categories rated
socioeconomic constraints lowest, whereas those in our
medium and large categories had the highest scores. Very
large concessions seem to have the influence and resources to
control their operating environment. Their size and influence
sheltered them frommost problems. Small concessions, often
community or family based, focused on local buyers and were
protected against external forces by the fact that they were
well integrated into local society.
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Medium and large concessions were trapped between
these two extremes. They were too small to have significant
influence over their local operating environment but were
large enough to have to compete in the international arena
and to be exposed to external pressures. They were therefore
the ones that experienced the largest number of problems,
and also the ones that experienced the highest variation in
conditions, as reflected by the length of the interquartile
distribution graph.
Endogenous environmental problems amounted to 37%
of the total score for environmental problems identified by
the concessionaires, with logging roads and erosion being
the main issues. Induced problems (63% of the total score)
were dominated by hunting, followed at a large distance
by agricultural encroachment and illegal logging. The main
point upon which the loggers and their critics agreed was the
major impact of hunting. This is consistent with international
research (Robinson & Bennett 2000; Brown & Williams
2003). It is interesting to compare the perceptions of logging
operators with the image presented by some media and
conservation NGOs. While hunting, illegal logging and roads
(that facilitate hunting and illegal logging) are prominent
in the international debate about logging in Central Africa
(Sayer et al. 2005), fires, pollution, erosion and agricultural
encroachment (the last two rated higher than illegal logging
by concessionaires) were totally absent from these debates.
Our data highlighted country differences in the importance
allocated to different types of environmental problems. The
incipient logging industry of theDRCtended to stress induced
problems, whereas mature logging industries such as those
of Cameroon and Gabon tended to emphasize endogenous
impacts. Likewise, foreign-owned concessions stressed the
endogenous problems they caused, while nationally-owned
concessions tended to attribute more importance to induced
problems. It is unclear whether these differences are the result
of objective variations in environmental effects or a product
of the social and political discourse to which the actors were
exposed. It would be interesting to pursue this analysis with a
larger sample of concessions and with direct field assessments.
Some logging operators seemed to be dynamic enterprises,
adapting, anticipating and promoting changes in the whole
sector. Policy, infrastructure, markets and technology were
the key drivers of change identified in our sample. Regional
and international forestry institutions tended to be grouped in
the responses and were perceived as having the least influence
in changing industry practices. This reflects an emerging
scepticism about the proliferation of international institutions
and initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable forestry. Most
of our respondents considered that more practical, on-the-
ground factors were more significant, with the exception
of certification and associated pressure groups, which were
perceived as having a moderate influence on changes in the
concessions. This suggests that lobbying groups who were
promoting certification were succeeding in inducing changes
in management practices by loggers. In the Amazon region,
a Chinese wood industry had been searching for certified
timber, end products of which are destined for the European
market (ITTO 2005). This supports the conclusion of a
global review of uptake of the EcosystemApproach Principles
adopted in 2000 by the Convention on Biological Diversity
that moves towards more environmentally and socially benign
forestry inmany countries have been driven by local pressures
and incentives muchmore than by international pressures and
agreements (Sayer & Maginnis 2005).
Cameroon scored highest for the impact of CEFDHAC,
suggesting that although CEFDHAC is a regional structure
it has more influence in the country that hosts its secretariat
than it does elsewhere.
The new policies that are being developed by several
countries have the highest influence in changing concession
practices. An analysis of the major changes brought about by
the policies that have appeared in the last decade showed that
they are the direct result of two key policy components:
• Environmental regulations: high-standard management
plans, following strict national guidelines and norms,
have become mandatory for concessions. This has lead
to a growing demand for technical expertise that is only
partially being met by a handful of foreign consulting
companies that charge international fees. Only large
concessionaires can really afford such technical support.
CAR is an exception where a public institution, backed by
foreign aid, is in charge of preparing the management
plans for the six large companies who operate in the
country.
• Forest taxation reforms and social transfer requirements
have generally increased the fiscal and financial pressures
on companies. This is putting pressure on companies that
have variable production or that are sensitive to timber
demand and price variations on the international market.
The diversity of the responses from different countries
reflects the variability of conditions within the region (Ruiz
Pe´rez et al. 2005). The high scores in DRC are more
an indication of fast changes in its logging industry after
the stabilization of the political situation than a reflection
of a dynamic and innovative industry. The high ranking
in DRC indicates a very low starting point. Gabon and
specially the CAR appeared to have the least responsive
(not necessarily least advanced) logging concessions, which
is probably linked to the fact that these two countries had
large concessions, relatively little domestic processing and a
fairly stable regulatory and institutional framework.
The higher scores given to inter-continental competition
and the role of ITTO by concessions supplying the European
market seems to be an indication of new developments
in international tropical timber markets. Asian markets are
growing faster thanEuropeanmarkets, and ITTO is perceived
as a guarantor of international market stability for European
more than for Asian markets.
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CONCLUSIONS
Scale (both physical and financial), origin of capital andmarket
orientation have been acting as structuring factors for the
forest sector in the region. Concentration on one hand and
fragmentation on the other seem to be the current trend in the
logging industry of the Congo Basin. Large foreign-owned
companies seem to be able to cope with new public regulations
and export standards required bywesternmarkets;many small
African companies are positioned to exploit local markets
and use their ties with local administrations and national
governments to avoid costly changes which would be required
if laws were enforced stringently. Medium-sized and large
companies are suffering the disadvantages of social visibility
(Hoh & Vignaux 2006) which makes bypassing the law much
more difficult. They are also exposed to greater competition
and to the environmental requirements of their main export
markets. An example of this is the recent collapse of medium-
sized and large companies in Cameroon and Gabon (Buttoud
et al. 2005; Fochive´ 2005).
Many new public policies have been prepared with the
active support of foreign donors. They have the effect of
increasing the fixed costs of logging activities, thus favouring
the largest companies with strong financial backing. This is
encouraging a trend towards the consolidation of the industry
into a smaller number of large companies. The new regulatory
frameworks come at a time of a major shift in global tropical
timber markets. A notable example of the consolidation of the
industry is the expansion of the Hong Kong-based Vicwood
group, which controls six companies in Cameroon (Global
Forest Watch 2005), and in three years has taken over
two existing companies in Congo-Brazzaville and the CAR.
Governments have tried to avoid excessive industry consol-
idation by imposing limits on concession size (200 000 ha in
Cameroon, for example). However suchmeasures are difficult
to apply when many concessions operate under different
names, but are owned by a single holding company.
‘Consolidation at the top’ and ‘fragmentation at the
bottom’ are not totally new phenomena. The globalization
and integration processes taking place in the forest industry
have already been reported (ILO [International Labour
Organization] 2001). Studies suggest that large companies
prefer to obtain their raw materials from smaller enterprises.
This strategy enables them to avoid regulations (notably
the volume limitation imposed by the limitations on areas
annually open to logging) and to escape some taxes (CIRAD
[Centre International en Recherche Agronomique pour
le De´veloppement]/Institutions et De´veloppement 2000).
However, sincemany of these large companies are now looking
for high-standard certification, it is likely that such a practice
will tend to decline.
The policy discourse amongst some conservation and
development organizations is driven by an over-simplified
view of the factors at work in determining the performance
of logging companies in the Congo Basin. There is a failure
to recognize the complexity and variability of the situation on
the ground and to acknowledge the opportunities that exist to
encourage companies to improve their standards of corporate
responsibility. Outside advisers tend to address problems
through advocating further regulation and restrictions and
to ignore the options for incentives and the removal of those
constraints that discourage moves to better performance.
Our results support the view of the logging industry as a
diversified sector. They offer evidence of the linkage between
the conditions in which concessions operate and the variation
in concessionaires’ perceptions and attitudes and suggest
explanations for that variability. A more extensive survey
using this approach could provide firm conclusions on the
origins of that variability and would suggest policy responses
that could better target causes of poor performance.
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